We propose that large stock market crashes are analogous to critical points studied in statistical physics with log-periodic correction to scaling. We extend our previous renormalization group model of stock market prices prior to and after crashes [D.
equilibrium systems .
In this work, we will focus on the most extreme behavior of stock markets, namely the two largest financial crashes in this century. Our Ariadne's thread is that complex systems often reveal more of their structure and organization in highly stressed situations than in equilibrium. Hence, our hope is that the study of these two large crashes will enable us to extract important new information about the dynamics of stock markets. Specifically, we are interested in describing the stock market behavior before and after a crash and our problem thus belongs to the more general problem of describing the transient behavior preceding a final equilibrium state assuming it exists. Our point of view is influenced by the concept of criticality developed in statistical physics in the last 30 years in order to describe a class of cooperative phenomena, such as magnetism and melting, and our hypothesis is that the stock market behaves as a driven out-of-equilibrium many-body system [1, 32] ¿From the open on wednesday 23 October 1929 to the close of tuesday 29 October 1929, the New York Stock Exchange lost almost 30% of its value. An often quoted origin of the crash is that traders thought that the bullish trend was due to continue, while the efficiency eventually brought back the market to its fundamentals. In a similar fashion, major indexes of market valuation in the United States declined by 30 percent or more from the opening on October 14 1987 to the market close on october 19 and in addition all major world markets declined substantially in the following month, in contrasts with the usual modest correlations of returns across countries. A lot of work has been carried out to unravel the origin(s) of the 1987 crash, notably in the properties of trading and the structure of markets; however, no clear cause has been singled out [33] . Maybe the most quoted scenario involves the role of portfolio insurance strategies in amplifying the descent. In the present work, we would like to defend the thesis that these two crashes have fundamentally similar origins, which must be found in the collective organization of the market traders leading to a regime known as a "critical" point.
In a previous paper [34] , we have identified precursory patterns, as well as af-tershock signatures and characteristic oscillations of relaxation, associated with the October 1987 crash up to 2.5 years in advance. Very similar results were obtained [35] for both the 1929 and 1987 crashes and here it was pointed out that the logfrequency of the observed log-periodic oscillations seems to decrease as the time of crash is approached.
In the present work, we will further substantiate that the concept of criticality can by applied to stock market crashes. We generalize our previous work [34] and show how the first generic nonlinear correction to the renormalization group equation previously proposed accounts quantitatively for the behavior of the Dow Jones and S&P 500 (Standard and Poor) indices up to 8 years prior to the crashes of 1929 and 1987. The conclusion is that the qualitative observation of [35] of the log-frequency shift is rationalized by the nonlinear correction.
Model and nonlinear generalization
Using the renormalization group (RG) formalism on the stock market index I amounts to assuming that the index at a given time t is related to that at another time t ′ by the transformations [34] 
where x = t c − t. t c is the time of global crash and φ is called the RG flow map. Here,
such that F = 0 at the critical point and µ is a constant describing the scaling of the index evolution upon a rescaling of time (1) . The function g(x) represents the non-singular part of the function F (x). We assume as usual [36] that the function F (x) is continuous and that φ(x) is differentiable.
As the simplest non-trivial solution beyond the pure power law solution to (2), we have proposed [34] 
It includes the first Fourier component of a general log-periodic correction to a pure power law behavior of an observable (here, the stock market index) exhibiting a singular behavior at the time t c of the crash, i.e., which becomes scale-invariant at the critical point t c . We have found (3) to fit the S&P500 data prior to the 1987 crash very well over a period of approximately two years before the crash. We have also tested (3) on a few other minor crashes after 1987 * . Expression (3) accounts very well for the two most important structures that are visible with the naked eye,
i.e., the overall accelerated increase before the crash as much as two years before it and its decoration by large scale oscillations whose linear frequency increases on the approach to the crash.
We now proceed to extend these results in order to show that precursors can be identified over a much longer time interval and that their structure can be deduced from a general renormalization group approach that we now present. In this goal, we notice that the solution (3) of the RG equation (2) together with (1) and the linear approximation φ(x) = λx can be rewritten as
stating simply that a power law is nothing but a linear relationship when expressed in the variables log F (x) and log x. A critical point is characterized by observables which have an invariant description with respect to scale transformations on x. We can exploit this and the expression (4) to propose the structure of the leading corrections to the power law with log-periodicity. Hence, we notice that (4) can be interpreted as a bifurcation equation for the variable F as a function of a fictitious "time" (log x) as a function of the "control parameter" α. When α > 0, F (x) increases with log x while it decreases for α < 0. The special value α = 0 separating the two regimes corresponds to a bifurcation [37] . Once we have recognized the structure of the expression (4) in terms of a bifurcation, we can use the general reduction theorem [37] telling us that the structure of the equation for F close to the bifurcation can only take a universal non-linear form given symmetries. Introducing the amplitude B and phase ψ of F (x) = Be iψ(x) , the only symmetry we can use is the fact that a global shift of the phase should keep the observable constant under a global change of units. This implies the following expansion :
(5) * These smaller crashes do not have a very long build-up time as the 1929 and 1987 crashes and the number of oscillations observed prior to these crashes are only one or two. Hence, the need for a log-periodic correction is not as obvious as with the two large crashes and we have not included the analysis of these smaller crashes here. In analogy with usual critical phenomena, we expect that the time interval over which the precursors of a crash are detectable (corresponding to the so-called width of the critical region) increases with the size of the crash. This rationalizes the strength of the log-periodic corrections for the two large crashes of the century.
where α > 0, ω, η and κ are real coefficients and O(F 3 ) means that higher order terms are neglected. Such expansions are known in the physics literature as Landau expansions [36] . We stress that this expression represents a non-trivial addition to the theory, constrained uniquely by symmetry laws.
The interesting situation is the one where x = 0 corresponds to a critical or singular point (characterized by an unstable fixed point) and the other fixed point (appearing due to the nonlinear correction) is stable. This occurs for η α < 0. Then, small x corresponds to being close to the critical point, whereas large x corresponds to the stable regime. In terms of the amplitude B and phase ψ of
whose solution reads
where B 2 ∞ = α |η| and x 0 is an arbitrary factor, fixing the time scale † .
Two regimes can be identified :
1. for small x close to the singular point, the solution is of the form
The log-periodic oscillations have a frequency equal to
in log x.
2. For large x, far from the singular point, the interesting situation is that of a stable phase at large x ( η α < 0) and we get
in log x. † These equations correspond to F (x) describing a spiral in the complex plane, while physical values occur only at intersections of the spiral with the real axis. This is obvious in the linear approximation and remains true qualitatively in presence of the non-linear corrections. Thus, this suggests to view the discrete renormalization group equation studied above as analogous to discrete maps obtained from Poincaré sections [37] of a continuous renormalization group flow.
For κ > 0, log-periodic oscillations, which can be detected far from the singular point, must have a larger frequency than close to the critical point. When going from outside the critical regime to inside the critical regime, the frequency decreases. The reverse holds for κ < 0.
The general form of (8) and (9) of the solutions of the nonlinear renormalization group equation (5) lead to the following modification of (3) :
where τ = t/φ and ∆ω = B 2 ∞ κ. Two new effects are predicted by (14) .
• There is a saturation of the function I(τ ) far from the critical point ;
• the log-frequency shifts from
, when approaching the time of the crash.
An interesting observation is that both effects are linked and controlled by the same parameter ∆t = x 0 , which measures the characteristic time scale controlling both the saturation and the log-frequency cross over.
Analysis of the 1929 and 1987 crashes
We have used (14) to fit the Dow Jones index prior to the 1929 crash and the S&P 500 index prior to the 1987 crash, both starting approximately 8 years prior to the crash.
It is not clear a priori what is a good measure of the "state" of the market. In [34] , we used the simplest and most straightforward parameter, namely the market index itself. Here, we take a slightly more sophisticated approach and test for other possibilities. The logarithm of the index can be argued to be a better choice. The reason is that the average growth of the index over the century is well-captured by an exponential rise with a typical rate of about 7% per year. Over 8 years, this
gives an increase by a factor ≈ 1.7, which is not negligible. This long-term average exponential growth is not the phenomenon that we are trying to detect as a signature of cooperative behavior but rather reflects the global price index variation as well as the global economic behavior. Instead of detrending the index by an average exponential growth with the caveat that it might distort the signal, we propose to use the logarithm of the index as a non-parametric proxy for the possible cooperative market behavior. Notice that our previous fit over 2 years has been done directly on the index as the exponential drift has only a minor influence over this restricted time scale. Pushing this line of reasoning further, we have also tested whether the subtraction of the average 7% yearly growth to the logarithm of the index modified the results. We now present the results obtained for the index I, for ln I and for ln I − rτ , where r is the average yearly growth rate.
The fitting was done as a minimization of the root-mean-square (r.m.s.) as costfunction, assuming gaussian distributed fluctuations, and using Downhill Simplex as minimization algorithm [38] . Since we are fitting a highly non-linear function with a priori 9 parameters to noisy data, many local minima exist for the cost-function.
Hence, the fitting was done in a rather elaborate way. First, the effective number of parameters was reduced by minimizing the cost-function with respect to the three linear variables A, B, C, thus determining A, B, C explicitly as a function of the six nonlinear variables α, t c , ∆t, ω, ∆ω and φ. This procedure thus reduces the number of free variables in the fit from 9 to 6. Due to the risk of the minimization algorithm getting trapped in one of the many potential local minima, a preliminary scan, or a so-called Taboo search [39] , was made using a range of physically reasonable values for t c , ∆t, ω and ∆ω and fitting only α and φ. To be specific, this means that ∆t cannot have a value that is much larger or much smaller than the time interval of the data, since it measures the characteristic time scale controlling both the saturation and the log-frequency cross over. Also, very large values for ω cannot be accepted either, since it means that we are fitting fluctuations on very short time scales, i.e., "noise".
After the scan, all minima satisfying 0 < α < 1 was selected and are taken as the starting values of fits with (14) to the data with all 6 non-linear variables free.
However, since φ is just a time unit and only depends on whether we count in days, months or years, the fit is essentially controlled by the five parameters α, t c , ∆t, ω, ∆ω In figures 1a and 2a, the best fits to the logarithm of the S&P 500 index prior to the 1987 crash and to the logarithm of the Dow Jones index prior to the 1929 crash are shown. We see that the general trend of the data is well-captured by the proposed relation over more than 7 years. In order to quantify this statement, the relative error of the fit to the data has been calculated, see figures 1b and 2b, and the error is < ∼ 10% on the entire time interval. In figure 1a , the thin line represents the best fit with equation (14) over the whole time interval, while the thick line is the fit by (3) on the subinterval from July 1985 to the end of 1987 as done in [34] but is represented on the full time interval starting in 1980. The comparison with the thin line allows one to visualize the frequency shift described by (14) .
Using the indexes I themselves gave similar solutions, but the fitting were quite unstable and with a lot of degeneracy. We attribute this to the superposition of the average exponential trend. Also, the fits of ln I − rt gave results very similar to those shown in figures 1 and 2.
In general, the time of crash τ c changes very little (< 2%) and the log-frequency ω only moves by ≈ 25% for the best fits using the three different measures. This is to be expected as the time scale is not modified. However, the modulation of the log-frequency, determined by ∆t and ∆ω, is the less constrained than τ c and ω
and changes significantly as we go from I to ln I or to ln I − rτ . Furthermore, the exponent α increases (by a factor of ≈ 3) for the best fits as the I-axis is compressed by the detrending (when going from I to ln I).
Observe that on relatively short time scales, we see many jumps not accounted for by (14) and obviously other processes than the ones considered here are influencing the stock market behavior on these time scales. Also, higher order terms of the solution of the renormalization group equation are not included in (14) . They could play an important role at shorter time scales as the complete solution to all orders is expected to lead to a "fractal" structure with wavy patterns at all scales.
Discussion
To validate the proposed model requires that one obtains a good fit in several data sets with approximately the same parameter values. Stated somewhat pointedly: one good fit make a data description; two good fits make a system description. In both cases, the fit has an overall error of less then 10 percent over a time interval extending up to 8 years before the crashes. There are presumably other sorts of fits that would work, although the fact that 8 years of data can be adjusted with an error of less then 10 percent using only 5 parameters (not counting the arbitrary time unit φ) is rather remarkable. It is surely irrational to infer the validity of a description based on a single fit. If it works for many fits, however, and if there is a reasonable theory for it, it should have some truth in it. In order to qualify such a statement, we observe that the value of the exponent α and the log-frequency ω for the two great crashes are quite close to each other. We find α 1929 = 0.63 and α 1987 = 0.68. This is in agreement with the universality of the exponent α predicted from the renormalization group theory. A similar universality is also expected for the log-frequency, albeit with a weaker strength as it has been shown [40] that fluctuations and noise will modify ω differently depending on their nature. We find from the fits that ω 1929 = 5.0 and
. These values are not unexpected and correspond to what has been found for other crashes as well as for earthquakes [41, 42] and for related rupture and growth phenomena [43, 44, 45, 46] . If we were fitting random fluctuations around some average power law rise, then the obtained value of ω would generally be higher and fluctuate more due to the noise-fitting we would be performing. The stock market provides a remarkable realization of a complex self-organizing system and the log-periodic structure found prior to crashes implies the existence of a hierarchy of characteristic time scales, corresponding to the time intervals t c − t n , determined from the equation ω log(t c − t n ) + φ = n2π for which the cosine in (14) The main point of this paper is that the market anticipates the crash in a subtle self-organized and cooperative fashion, hence releasing precursory "fingerprints" observable in the stock market prices. In other words, this implies that market prices contain information on impending crashes. If the traders were to learn how to decipher and use this information, they would act on it and on the knowledge that others act on it and the crashes would probably not happen. Our results suggest a weaker form of the "weak efficient market hypothesis" [49] This process has been discussed in biology for instance in animal populations such as ant colonies or in connection with the emergence of consciousness [1, 50] . The usual efficient market hypothesis will be recovered in this context when the traders learn how to extract this novel collective information and act on it.
Most previous models proposed for crashes have pondered the possible mechanisms to explain the collapse of the price at very short time scales. Here in contrast, we propose that the underlying cause of the crash must be searched years before it in the progressive accelerating ascent of the market price, reflecting an increasing built-up of the market cooperativity. From that point of view, the specific manner by which prices collapsed is of not of real importance since, according to the concept of the critical point, any small disturbance or process may have triggered the instability.
The intrinsic divergence of the sensitivity and the growing instability of the market close to a critical point might explain why attempts to unravel the local origin of the crash have been so diverse. Essentially, anything would work once the system is ripe.
Our view is that the crash has an endogenous origin and that exogenous shocks only serve as triggering factors. We propose that the origin of crashes is much more subtle and is constructed progressively by the market as a whole. In this sense, this could be termed a systemic instability. b) The relative error of the fit by (14) to the data. b) The relative error of the fit by (14) to the data. 
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